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Social Network Hierarchy and Rational Group
Decision Making: An Experimental Study of
the Conjunction Fallacy
Sean Richey and Sarah Brosnany
Abstract
We test the inuence of social hierarchy in political discussion
with an experiment. We examine whether hierarchy is detrimen-
tal to group decision-making by using Tversky and Kahneman's
(1983) logic question which tests the conjunction fallacy. We seek
to determine whether the benecial impact of group decision-
making holds in hierarchical groups. To do so, we randomly as-
signed 176 participants to zero-history groups of ve discussants.
Two thirds of these groups had one member randomly assigned to
be the group's leader, while the remaining groups had no leader.
We nd that groups with leaders conform to their leader's be-
liefs. If the leader was able to answer correctly the conjunction
fallacy question, then group members are also more likely to re-
solve the conjunction fallacy. In groups where the leader was
incorrect, group members are more likely to incorrectly answer.
Thus, group decision making is beneted by hierarchy when the
leader is correct, but harmed when the group leader is incorrect.
 Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Georgia State Uni-
versity, srichey@gsu.edu
y Assistant Professor, Department of Psychology, Georgia State University,
sbrosnan@gsu.edu
What role does social hierarchy play in group decision-making? Many schol-
ars see great potential for group discussion to benet decision-making (e.g.,
Druckman 2004, Lupia and McCubbins 2000, Mutz 2002). There is a signif-
icant body of literature that details the positive impact of social networking
in many areas, the overall nding being that advice from opinion leaders
helps the average person make better choices (Bennet, Flickinger, and Rhine
2000; Berelson, Lazarfeld, and McPhee 1954; Conover, Searing, and Crewe
2002; Gastil and Dillard 1999; Huckfeldt, Sprague, and Levine 2000; Katz
and Lazarfeld 1955; Lazarfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944; Levine 2005; Neu-
man 1986; Price, Cappella, and Nir 2002). In particular, public deliberation
is potentially helpful to most citizens, because they often know little about
politics (see Ackerman and Fiskin 2004, Barabas 2004, Bartels 1996, 2005,
Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), and low-information rationality in decision
making is common (Popkin 1991). Many researchers posit that group dis-
cussion can realistically achieve the deliberative ideal if opinion leaders share
their knowledge with people who are uninformed{who can in turn spread
that knowledge to others, thereby giving rise to \multiplier eects" (Huck-
feldt 2001).
This formulation has the potential to explain much about why democracy
works and how it can be improved. However, discussion is often bound by
intuitionalized group hierarchies that are not tested in current research. Our
research manipulates social hierarchy in discussion groups to provide data to
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test theories of human social interaction in a way that was not previously
possible. Random assignment in controlled experimental conditions will en-
sure that there is no selection bias, which plagues much research on social
interaction.
How benecial is deliberation in groups that do not have group equality?
In particular, groups that have subservience to social superiors may have
deleterious eects on the goal of bringing about better decisions through
group discussion. Obedience to hierarchical superiors will limit one's ability
to engage in open, frank discussions that stimulate better decision-making
processes. Considering the impact of group hierarchy, we must scrutinize
whether group discussion can help people make wise decisions because we do
not know to what the extent group discussion is benecial in groups with a
pervasive social hierarchy. Discussion in groups with social hierarchies may
lead to blind acceptance of the beliefs of a superior{or, at the very least, an
unwillingness to engage in debate with him or her.
We know that everyday social interactions greatly inuence behavior
(Klofstad 2007; McClurg 2006; Mutz and Mondak 2006), and it is often ben-
ecial for decision-making. For example, Eveland and Hively (2009) show
that discussion frequency, network size, and some types of network hetero-
geneity increase political knowledge. And Gastil and Dillard (1999) show
that open discussion with disagreeing others increases public opinion qual-
ity. But prior research does not test subservience to hierarchical elites as a
source of similarity in networks. The role of hierarchy is particularly worri-
some since the goals of one's social superiors may very well dier from one's
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own. For example, Ryan (2010) nds that discussion with opinion leaders
does educate, but the impact of partisanship in the network is a greater in-
uence than knowledge. Simply put, we do not know whether the opinion
leader is biasing the information being given, or that the person assuming
the leadership role is the most knowledgeable about the issue at hand.
Our aim is to test the hypothesis that group discussion can help peo-
ple make wise decisions in groups with clear social hierarchies. We test the
inuence of discussion with social superiors with an experiment in groups
with dierences in social hierarchies. Specically, we posit that deferring to
hierarchical superiors limits the ability to have the open frank discussions
that are at the core of group decision-making. We test this in groups with
randomly-selected leaders. We use Tversky and Kahneman's (1983) logic
question which stimulates the conjunction fallacy, to test whether hierarchy
is detrimental to group decision-making. Previous research shows that group
decision-making helps solve the conjunction fallacy, as participants are able
to answer logic questions more rationally when placed in a group that dis-
cusses it than they do when answering alone. We seek to test whether this
benecial impact of group decision-making holds in hierarchical groups. To
do so, we randomly assigned 176 participants to zero-history groups of ve
discussants. Two-thirds of these groups had one member randomly assigned
to be the group's leader, while the remaining groups were in a control con-
dition with no leader. We nd that groups with leaders conform to their
leader's beliefs. If the leader was able to answer correctly the conjunction
fallacy question, group members are more likely to follow that belief and
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resolves the conjunction fallacy. In groups where the leader was incorrect,
group members are also more likely to follow that incorrect belief. Thus,
group decision making is beneted by hierarchy when the leader is correct,
but harmed when the group leader is incorrect.
The Benecial Impact of Group Decision-making
It is often suggested that exposure to multiple sources of information in-
creases the quantity of one's knowledge, and improves the quality of one's
decision-making (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944). For example,
Page (2007) shows that combining bits of information garnered in individual
conversations{some of which may overlap from one conversation to another{
may yield a result which is greater than the sum of its parts. Grofman, Owen,
and Feld (1983) show with formal modeling that, although group-think is a
potential problem, more often than not, group decision-making leads to su-
perior outcomes because one person's mistakes are corrected by the group.
For example, researchers infer the inuence of social networks by nding that
similarity of vote choice between more and less knowledgeable discussants is
greater than one would predict based on other known determinants of vote
choice. The higher homogeneity shows the impact of the network. The great
contribution of this body of literature is that it lays aside the traditional
sociological perspective that posited the absence of persuasive discussion as
being due to cognitive dissonance and conformity pressures (e.g., Festinger
1957). Nir (2005), for example, shows that most types of network heterogene-
4
ity will not harm the willingness to participate and actually stimulates more
considered opinions about politics. People do inuence each other's politi-
cal beliefs and actions through discussion, and this has been shown in many
countries (Ikeda and Huckfeldt 2001; Huckfeldt, Ikeda, and Pappi 2005).
Druckman (2004) makes an important contribution by showing that mis-
takes are common when individuals make decisions solely. For example, given
simple problems, most people can be easily manipulated in predictable ways,
such as risk aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Druckman (2004) shows
that the irrational framing eects found by Tversky and Kahneman (1981)|
which critics of deliberative democracy often point to|are not present when
people are allowed to discuss their choices freely. He nds that discussion
promotes rational choices. Additionally, Lupia and McCubbins (2000) show
through experiments the power of discussion in helping people correctly pre-
dict coin toss results that they have never seen, implying that people can
make the correct choice through discussion. If people discuss their options,
they are far less likely to fall into common intellectual traps. In partic-
ular, if people with dierent stores of information communicate with one
another, these irrational biases all but disappear. It is important, then, not
to base research on atomistic views of political animals. By incorporating so-
cial networking into research on rationality, we can more realistically model
decision-making, which is often done with input from others (Mendelberg
2005).
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Power in Group Decision-making
However, the positive impact of group discussion may be valid only in the
absence of power dierentials among discussants. While it is generally agreed
that evenly distributed discussion and deliberation improve decision making,
there is currently an important theoretical debate on power dierentials in
deliberation. Many critiques of deliberative democracy (sometimes called
discourse theory) argue that power will almost always be unevenly distributed
in discussion (such as critiques of Habermas in Foucault 2002). This is a
crucial potential aw in this theory that has been explicated by both Feminist
and Post-structuralist critiques of deliberative democracy (see Cohen and
Arato 1992). Even though discourse theorists try to eliminate some of the
raw power dierentials by having structured norms of equality and mutual
respect, the underlying problem of power dierences between discussants in
these formal settings remains (see Ackerman and Fishkin (2004) for more on
some specic procedures).
To given an example, when men and women debate, it is possible that
men will gain acquiescence from women by \winning" the debate, which
may seem to be a fair way to resolve conict (Frazer 1992). If, however,
the men win the debate and gain the outcome they desire due to social
customs that promote male hierarchical dominance, then this is not a fair
process and decision-making by group discussion merely tricks women into
submission (Frazer 1992). Critically, these power inequities may create sub-
optimal group decisions. Yet, there have been no formal, empirical testing of
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these critiques with clearly articulated hypotheses in controlled experimental
conditions. Furthermore, these critiques may not go far enough as they do not
take seriously the cultural dierences that may lead to dierential inuences
of hierarchy across dierent cultures.
We know that groups commonly have leaders, and, thus, this aspect of
groups should be incorporated into research on group decision-making. Blind
obedience to a social superior may lead to similarity of opinion, but it does
not necessarily demonstrate that a meaningful group discussion has taken
place, or that the inuence of the social superior has served to educate the
lower-status discussant, a crucial component of the theory (see Cooke 2000).
Simply put, we do not know the inuence of this omitted variable. Due to the
unmeasured inuence of hierarchy on deliberations, the positive inuence of
social networks on decision-making may be less common than previous liter-
ature suggests. Reformers who promote political deliberation and discussion
should consider the impact of social hierarchy.
While past research provides evidence of the benets of group decision-
making, much of it does not examine other common social forces in group
discussion, such as the relative power of the discussants. Thus, additional
experiments are needed to test other inuences in group decision-making,
such as social hierarchy. Including this variable of social hierarchy will greatly
inform our understanding of social decision-making.
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The Conjunction Fallacy
To test whether or not groups can make a correct decision, we will use a
commonly-used logic question from cognitive psychology, on the conjunction
fallacy. It is derived from Tversky and Kahneman (1983). In their exper-
iment, subjects were asked to read the following and rank which choice is
more probable:
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She ma-
jored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with
issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated
in anti-nuclear demonstrations. Which is more probable?
A. Linda is a bank teller.
B. Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.
The original Tversky and Kahneman (1983) experiment (subsequently
replicated across many samples) shows that over 80% of subjects incorrectly
chose sequence B, since Linda resembles an active feminist more than she
resembles a bank teller. However, sequence A is superior to B, because
sequence A is included in B. B (Linda is a bank teller and is active in the
feminist movement) is just A (Linda is a bank teller) with an additional
condition (is active in the feminist movement). Thus, this question tests the
conjunction fallacy that is formally dened as, for all A and B, P(B&A) <=
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P(A). Since the probability that A and B are simultaneously true is always
less than or equal to the probability that A is true, sequence B cannot be
more likely than sequence A. The common explanation for this fallacy is that
the participant is inuenced by the representativeness heuristic. The details
given about Linda's college days makes Linda resemble the representative
heuristics of feminists more than bank teller, so subjects are primed to reach
an irrational conclusion.
This logic question was chosen to test group decision-making for three im-
portant reasons. First, there is an objectively correct answer. Other possible
topics such as public policy debates will not allow us to examine the role of
the group leader in providing incorrect information, as it would be dicult
to nd an a priori correct answer for these policy decisions, unless they are
articial replications of these cognitive fallacies, such as alternative questions
from Tversky and Kahneman. Additionally, the conjunction fallacy plagues
decision-making in a variety of important real-world situations. Gaining data
on its spread in public-discussion is valuable. Finally, previous research on
group decision-making has used Tversky and Kahneman questions allowing
us to compare our results to these previous studies (e.g., Druckman 2004).
Experimental Procedures
To investigate the role of hierarchy in group decision-making, we conducted
an experiment on a convenience sample of 176 undergraduates at a large
public research university in the southeastern United States. Participants
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were given $10 to participate. Participants rst answered a questionnaire
that contained demographic information, and a conjunction fallacy question
from Tversky and Kahneman (1983) that was described above (Linda is a
bank teller...), after which they handed in their questionnaire. Importantly,
the pre-experiment questionnaire allows us to know whether the participant
is inuenced by their group, because we know how they answered the logic
question before discussion. We will also know whether the individual answer
diers from the group answer. Following this, participants were randomly
assigned to small discussion groups of ve participants.
To test the inuence of hierarchy in discussion networks, the groups were
divided into three experimental conditions. In the condition 1, a randomly
selected member was chosen to be the group leader from amongst the set who
had answered the question correctly the rst time. The leader was appointed
by the experimenter telling the group that this person was their leader. The
leaders were told to explain their logic for answering the question to the
group. In condition 2, the leader was chosen from amongst the set that had
answered the question incorrectly the rst time. The leader was appointed
in the same way and again was told to explain their logic to their group.
In the control condition (3), each group had no assigned leader (no leader
condition) and answered the question after twenty minutes of discussion.
Correct Leader Condition: The experimenter will select a member of the
discussion group to be the group leader. The group was instructed that this
person is the group's leader. The group leader was randomly chosen from the
subset that correctly answered the logic question in a pre-test questionnaire.
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Incorrect Leader Condition: The experimenter will select a member of the
discussion group to be the group leader. The group is informed as in con-
dition one. The group leader was randomly chosen from the subset that
incorrectly answered the logic question in a pre-test questionnaire
Control Condition: A control condition in which no leader assigned and the
group is expressly told not to choose a leader.
They were then told to discuss the same logic question with members
of their group, and answer it again after 20 minutes of discussion. They
were told that if they answer it correctly the second time, they will receive
$10. They were also informed that they could answer dierently from their
rst answer or from their group, if they believed that the group was wrong.
This incentive structure accurately matches decision-making, where follow-
ing one's social group may or may not lead to optimal outcomes for each
individual member. The group leaders were told to explain their logic to the
group orally. For the condition without a leader (Condition 3), discussion
proceeded with no leader. After twenty minutes of discussion, the partici-
pants were given the nal questionnaire and instructed to write the answer
that they believe the group thinks-termed \group answer", and then also
write a separate second answer of their opinion as to the correct answer after
group discussion-termed \second individual answer". The participants also
answered an open-ended question on why they chose their answer. This al-
lowed us to track the inuence of hierarchy, by tracking the spread of correct
and incorrect inuence on decision-making.
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Hypotheses
Our aim is to investigate the role of group discussion on decision-making. We
hypothesize that group discussion will impact decision-making. Specically
we predict that a leader with good information (correct leader condition)
will increase the frequency of correct responses as compared to the control
condition. The incorrect leader condition will decrease the frequency of cor-
rect responses as compared to the control condition. This will show that
hierarchy has an inuence on group decision-making.
Data and Methods
The sample was selected from a mandatory introductory course in American
politics, and thus matched the demographics of the university closely. It was
70% female, with an average age of 19. Racially, it was 13% Asian, 52%
black, 23% white, and 9% other race. It contained students from 32 majors.
This diverse sample provides an excellent understanding of decision making
among diverse groups of people, as are present in real world situations. We
randomly assigned each participant to discussion groups of ve people. These
participants were selected to come from dierent classes, and each was asked
if they knew any other members. All participants reported having no famil-
iarity with their group members, so these are so-called zero-history groups,
which are commonly used in research on group decision-making (for example,
see Gastil, Black, and Moscovitz 2008).
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Variable codings
The dependent variable is coded 1 if they answer the logic question correctly,
and zero if not. Again, the question was:
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She ma-
jored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with
issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated
in anti-nuclear demonstrations. Which is more probable?
A. Linda is a bank teller.
B. Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.
The distribution of answers is 25% answered it correctly, and 75% in-
correctly. Additionally, we use the answers from the pre-test questionnaire,
which was answered before group discussion, to determine how discussion
changes the participant's answer. This variable of Change is coded 1 if the
participants answered the question correctly after group decision, but had
answered it incorrectly previously, it is coded zero, if there was no change
between the answers, and -1 if the participant had answered it correctly in
the pre-test and then changed to an incorrect answer. The distribution of
this change is in Figure 1.
[Figure 1 around here.]
The key independent variables were indicator variables for each condi-
tion. We also measured how long the group deliberated for, as some groups
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did not discuss it for the full 20 minutes. We expect that longer deliberation
will increase correct answers. We use the rst answer as a control for how
the participant's cognitive abilities react to the conjunction fallacy. We also
control for being male, Asian, Black and Other Race, income (in $5000 brack-
ets), and age. We measure education by being a psychology major, because
some of these students may have had exposure to the conjunction fallacy in
psychology courses. The summary statistics for these data are listed in Table
1.
[Table 1 around here.]
Methods
For the dichotomous dependent variable, we use a probit regression model.
The data on discussants are clustered by each participant's group. Probit
egression models require observations to be independent, but here the nested
data structure violates this assumption. To account for this nesting, we use
robust standard errors in the vote similarity models below (see Woodbridge
2002, 482).
Results
We hypothesized that the leaders would have inuence over their group,
aecting decision making. In particular, we predicted that participants in
groups whose leaders had good information should show better performance
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than the control group, and that those in groups with leaders with bad in-
formation should show the worst performance of all three groups. These
predictions were supported by these data (see Figure 1). In the control
group (with no leader), the percent who answered correctly after discussion
increased by 34% percentage points. This shows that group decision-making
in the absence of a leader is superior to individual decision-making. Nonethe-
less, individuals in the correct leader condition increased their percentage
correctly answered after discussion by 52%, which is a signicantly greater
increase than the control condition, as we had hypothesized (p = .000). Fi-
nally, information alone is not sucient to solve the problem; individuals in
the incorrect leader condition did answer more correctly after the discussion,
but the increase was only 18%, far less than the control condition (p = .001).
It is interesting that discussion is benecial in all treatments, however clearly
it is much less benecial when a leader is using incorrect logic.
[Figure 2 around here.]
In Table 2, the results of a probit regression model for determinants of
a correct answer are shown. We see again that being in the correct leader
condition leads to greater likelihood of answering correctly, while having an
incorrect leader lowered this likelihood when compared to the control group.
Additionally, we see that in model 2, the even when controlling for the par-
ticipant's rst answer|which has a strong signicant impact|the treatment
eects hold. We also nd that the longer the groups deliberated also had a
positive impact on decision-making, as expected. The other variables do not
15
have signicant eects.
[Table 2 around here.]
Conclusion
The results show that social hierarchy is an important factor in group dis-
cussion. Richerson and Boyd (2004) show that interpersonal communication
is crucial to understand human accomplishment, but we nd that commu-
nication is moderated by group hierarchy. As hierarchy is common in many
groups, it is troubling for democratic theory that hierarchical discussion cre-
ates sub-optimal performance, because informed autonomous choice free from
coercion is foundational for democracy (Habermas 1984). When discussion
is not based on getting knowledge but deference to leaders, the eect of
hierarchy will only be positive if the leader is correct.
This research suggests that we should escape the easy generalizations
commonly made about the public's ability to use deliberation to make better
decisions. Improving democratic practices is crucial for advanced industrial
nations (Putnam 2007). Gaining knowledge about the impact of power re-
lations in social interaction may allow insights that facilitate better policies
on deliberative forums. If the impact of unequal power in discussion net-
works within deliberative public forums is known, this knowledge can result
in eective public discussion. By determining the impact of cultural values
toward power in society, it will tell us how to provide an environment that
is conducive to successfully using deliberation. For example, policy-makers
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and activists can sponsor deliberative opportunities with more emphasis on
actively ensuring that equal power in the discussion is given to all partici-
pants.
These results also suggest that in cultures where hierarchical inuence is
profound, the inuence of hierarchy will decrease the amount of educative
discussion. The clear, strong results found in this study conrm the limits
of Huckfeldt's (2001) theory of social network diusion of political expertise.
Political discussion is not necessarily free from coercion in all cultures. This
is one way in which citizens can lose their ability to use political discussion
to improve their understanding of politics. These results suggest that just
as with formal deliberation, people need equality to meaningfully engage in
informal discussion as a way of exchanging political information.
Future research into the role of social networks in opinion formation
should carefully examine the role of hierarchy. It is possible that hierarchical
inuences limit comprehension from political discussion in other cultures as
well, perhaps even in the United States. For example, India has long history
of social hierarchy, and an interesting extension of this research would be to
analyze if this impact also happens in countries with these more salient social
hierarchies. An additional concern with hierarchical societies is that many
will self-silence their opinions and choose not to initiate discussions about
politics.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
Change 0.347 0.555 -1 1
Correct second answer 0.597 0.492 0 1 176
Correct leader 0.347 0.477 0 1 176
Incorrect leader 0.369 0.484 0 1 176
Discussion time 10.426 5.263 2 20 176
Correct rst answer 0.25 0.434 0 1 176
Asian 0.131 0.338 0 1 176
Black 0.523 0.501 0 1 176
Other 0.085 0.28 0 1 176
Age 19.052 1.783 18 30 173
Male 0.307 0.462 0 1 176
Income 1.28 1.037 0 9 175
Psychology major 0.08 0.271 0 1 176
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Table 2: Determinants of Answering Correctly
Variable Republican (S. E.) Democratic (S. E.)
Correct leader 0:500+ (0:271) 0:545 (0:279)
Incorrect leader  0:443+ (0:267)  0:517+ (0:278)
Discussion time 0:044 (0:021) 0:039+ (0:022)
Correct rst answer 1:056 (0:272)
Asian  0:301 (0:339)  0:171 (0:350)
Black 0:138 (0:243) 0:269 (0:256)
Other  0:050 (0:396) 0:012 (0:404)
Age  0:062 (0:061)  0:085 (0:068)
Male  0:077 (0:223)  0:084 (0:232)
Income 0:049 (0:105) 0:030 (0:114)
Psychology major  0:082 (0:365) 0:196 (0:374)
Intercept 0:930 (1:157) 2:169 (1:325)
Number of cases 172 172
-2 Log likelihood 18:94 35:63
Note: Cells represent unstandardized coecients and standard errors of pro-
bit regression models for determinants of the respondent answering correctly
after group discussion. Standard errors are clustered on discussion group.
+p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01
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Figure 1: This graph shows average change in answering the conjunction
fallacy question after group discussion.
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Figure 2: This graph shows average improvement in answering the conjunc-
tion fallacy question after group discussion across the three experimental
conditions. The dierence between the experimental conditions and the con-
trol group is statistically signicant at the .05 level for both conditions.
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